CAP: implications of fanout

[John Stracke <francis@xxxxxxxx>]

 Section 2.4 ("Security Model") points out that CAP's wide variety of 
connectivity scenarios complicates the security model; personally, I'd 
consider that another argument against fanout.

If we remove fanout, there is a lot of text in the draft to be removed. 
A probably-incomplete list:

   * 2.6: "A qualified calendar address is required when the <csid> of
     the target calendar address differs from that of the CAP server
     receiving the command".
   * 7.2.1.7, 7.2.2.{2,3,4}: response 2.2 makes sense only in case of
     fanout.
   * 8: response 2.0.6 makes sense only in case of fanout.

--
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|John Stracke    | http://www.ecal.com |My opinions are my own.|
|Chief Scientist |=============================================|
|eCal Corp.      |"HTTP is what happens in the absence of good |
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