Re: Just say NO to key escrow or CMR/ARR revisited

[Ian Brown <I.Brown@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

I have *tried* and *tried* to remain entirely non-abusive and stick to
the facts here. But since you are determined to attack this position -
your choice.

> Oh please, this is just more bad logic on top of bad logic.

Oh please, this is entirely non-substantiated irrelevant abuse. Save it
for somewhere else.

> Having a CMR flag in some public keys does not mean that everyone
> is using CMR

It does if a government mandates it. May I remind you what Barbara
Simons of the ACM's US Public Policy Committee said (since it seems to
have gone RIGHT over your head):

> 4. The NSA states that key recovery is doable and will not jeopardize
> national security. And there is an existence proof for key recovery
> software in the new PGP release.

> No that is not the purpose of this group. The purpose of this group is to
> provide a strong message encryption standard.

Well, why don't we just go with S/MIME then? That provides a strong
encryption standard within the US. DOH! It allows 40-bit encryption as
well. Oh well.

> Debate on the technical
> merits of any part of the spec is warranted, political fearmongering is
> not.

So, what would you describe Phil Zimmerman's speeches about human rights
and encryption as?

> Lets see here, you take a quote of a quote from a competitor of PGP Inc.
> as a factual statement and the basis of support for your position. Sorry
> you will have to do better than that.

Oh sorry, I didn't realise that a direct quote from Phil by a
'competitor' of PGP's was less valid than anyone else's. And Bruce
Schneier - what kind of clueless snake-oil purveyor is he? (IRONY
ALERT).

Let me quote Phil directly, from pgpdoc1. Is that OK?

> Most alarming of all is the White House's bold new encryption policy
> initiative, under development at NSA since the start of the Bush
> administration, and unveiled April 16th, 1993. The centerpiece of this
> initiative is a Government-built encryption device, called the Clipper
> chip, containing a new classified NSA encryption algorithm. The Government
> is encouraging private industry to design it into all their secure
> communication products, like secure phones, secure FAX,
> etc. AT&T is now putting the Clipper into their secure voice products.
> The catch: At the time of manufacture, each Clipper chip will be loaded with
> its own unique key, and the Government gets to keep a copy, placed in escrow.
> Not to worry, though -- the Government promises that they will use these keys
> to read your traffic only when duly authorized by law. Of course, to make
> Clipper completely effective, the next logical step would be to outlaw other
> forms of cryptography. 

Oh I'm sorry. Was that political fearmongering?

Ian.