Re: reserved ID allocation procedure

[jim@xxxxxxxxxx (Jim Gillogly)]

Paul Koning wrote:
> At 10:45 PM 7/8/98 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>    This is necessary because for new algorithms, or new features etc.,
>    there may well be multiple proposals for the same algorithm.  So
>    allocating #12 to the succesful AES candidate is in itself useless,
>    because there may be 2 or 3 incompatible implementations.
>    
> There's something odd about that.
> 
> If there is one AES but 2 incompatible implementations, then either
> the standard is broken, or (at least) one implementation is.  If the
> standard is correctly specified, then implementations will be
> compatible.  
> 
> So it seems to me reasonable to assign a number to "AES" on the
> assumption that the definers of AES will do their job properly.

While I agree that implementations of the same algorithm must
give the same results, there's still a reason for multiple numbers:
AES is defined by NIST to allow different key sizes: 128 bits,
192 bits, and 256 bits.  I suppose we could standardize on the
256-bit version, just for definiteness, but perhaps it makes sense
to allow for all three expected standard sizes.

	Jim Gillogly