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Re: Identifying revoked certificates
On Thu, 6 Sep 2001 14:33:10 -0700, Jon Callas said:
> Now then, a question for implementors: If this gets put in, would you
> implement it? "Yes, but not right away" is a fine answer, as are "Yes" and
I don't see a reason for the revocation target specifiers. The only
sound handling of self-signature revocations (and that's what we are
talking about) is to use the latest valid self-signature, be it a
revocation or a real self-signature. All other ways makes the
protocol more complex and ambiguous and is error prone. Checking the
timestamps of valid revocations and self-signatures is sufficient in
about all cases. There are only 2 problems I can identify with this:
* 2 signatures done in the same second.
Solution: Don't do this and if you receive one, choose one of them
by whatever means.
* Sequence of packets messed up.
This should not happen, but if it does there is the same chance that
the UIDs or subkeys and their self-signatures are out of order and so
one would need to specify the UID in the self-signature. Solution:
Either drop these packets because they don't comply to OpenPGP or
reorder them which might take a couple milliseconds. From experience
I know that the reordering is only rarely needed and in most cases due
to buggy keyserver implementations.
Werner Koch Omnis enim res, quae dando non deficit, dum habetur
g10 Code GmbH et non datur, nondum habetur, quomodo habenda est.
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