RE: OpenPGP Sub Keys (Was: key flag for authentication)

[Ian Brown <I.Brown@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

> If you are so paranoid, why don't you keep all your PGP keys
> in a "more secure offline machine" and use PGP solely on it? 

Because for the vast majority of messages that I send, the increased
security would not be worth the extra effort. Whereas the compromise of
a key used to certify other keys has a much greater effect, and so to
many people it would.

> Should you have a need for shorter-lifetime signing keys, 
> just generate master keys explicitly for that purpose.

The point of the master key/subkey structure is that you shouldn't have
to do this, with the Web of Trust complications it introduces -- as
Werner said.

> If indeed you have such needs, there is nothing to preclude 
> from generating two distinct keys, one for signing and the 
> other for encryption.

Nor is there anything to preclude me using the existing master
key/subkey structure to do this.

> Let me add, and no offence of course, from the fact that you 
> are relegating those short-lifetime signing sub keys to a 
> less secure environment, I infer that you have no confidence 
> in them,

Confidence is not a binary issue. I trust the environment they are used
in less; therefore I would give them a shorter lifetime, so that their
compromise would have a smaller impact.

Ian.