Archive of ietf-openpgp, by thread

• Re: Further deprecating PGP2, (continued)
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Jon Callas
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, David Shaw
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Derek Atkins
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, David Shaw
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Adam Back
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Adam Back
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Derek Atkins
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Jeroen van Gelderen
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Derek Atkins
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Jon Callas
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Mike Markowitz
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Jon Callas
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Ian Grigg
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Peter Gutmann
    • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Jeroen van Gelderen
    • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Jeroen van Gelderen
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Peter Gutmann
• Minor clarification for fingerprint calculation, David Shaw
  • Re: Minor clarification for fingerprint calculation, Jon Callas
    • Curiosity: use of deviant old-style headers in hash material, Michael Young
• Minor typo change, David Shaw
• Re: meeting in San Francisco? (v3 keys // IDEA), vedaal
• informal meeting in san francisco, Rodney Thayer
• Settling the TIGER question, David Shaw
  • Re: Settling the TIGER question, Jon Callas
    • Re: Settling the TIGER question, Len Sassaman
      • Re: Settling the TIGER question, David Shaw
      • Re: Settling the TIGER question, Len Sassaman
      • Re: Settling the TIGER question, David Shaw
      • Re: Settling the TIGER question, Derek Atkins
      • Re: Settling the TIGER question, Len Sassaman
      • Re: Settling the TIGER question, Jon Callas
      • Re: Settling the TIGER question, Werner Koch
• I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt, Internet-Drafts
  • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt, Bodo Moeller
    • Hard expiration dates (was: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), David Shaw
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Bodo Moeller
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), David Shaw
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Jon Callas
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-DACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Michael Young
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-DACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Jon Callas
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was:I-DACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Michael Young
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-DACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Bodo Moeller
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), David Shaw
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Bodo Moeller
      • Re: Hard expiration dates (was: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-07.txt), Mike Markowitz
• Bis-07 submitted, Jon Callas
• meeting in San Francisco?, Rodney Thayer
  • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Derek Atkins
    • Message not available
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Derek Atkins
    • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Rodney Thayer
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Derek Atkins
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Jon Callas
      • HKP (was Re: meeting in San Francisco?), David Shaw
      • Deprecating old keys (was Re: meeting in San Francisco?), David Shaw
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Werner Koch
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Jon Callas
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Len Sassaman
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Derek Atkins
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Len Sassaman
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Adam Back
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Jon Callas
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: meeting in San Francisco?, Len Sassaman
      • v4-only keyanalyze (was Re: meeting in San Francisco?), Jason Harris
      • Re: v4-only keyanalyze, Werner Koch
      • Re: v4-only keyanalyze, Jon Callas
      • Re: v4-only keyanalyze, Bodo Moeller
      • Further deprecating PGP2 (was: Re: meeting in San Francisco?), Michael Young
      • Re: Further deprecating PGP2, Werner Koch
• Obituary for Janis Jagars (Disastry), Len Sassaman
• How about this? (Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?), john . dlugosz
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: How about this? (Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?), vedaal
• Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, maf
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, vedaal
  • RE: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Dominikus Scherkl
    • RE: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Richard Laager
  • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, john . dlugosz
  • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Brian Smith
• Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Thomas Roessler
  • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, ned . freed
    • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Michael Young
      • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, ned . freed
      • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Thomas Roessler
      • let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Thomas Roessler
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Michael Young
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Bill Frantz
      • RE: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Richard Laager
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Simon Josefsson
      • RE: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Richard Laager
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, David Shaw
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Michael Young
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, David Shaw
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Michael Young
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Cyrus Daboo
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, ned . freed
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Len Sassaman
      • Re: let's look... Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Marc Mutz
      • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, ned . freed
      • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Michael Young
      • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Marc Mutz
    • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Simon Josefsson
      • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, ned . freed
      • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, David Shaw
  • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Greg Troxel
    • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, 山本和彦
  • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, Jon Callas
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Standardizing inline PGP for e-mail?, john . dlugosz
• Diffie-Hellman key agreement, Timo Schulz
• about cast cfb64, jfguo
  • Re: about cast cfb64, Michael Young
• Note Well Statement, The IESG
• Reference for "IETF name space"?, Michael Young
  • Re: Reference for "IETF name space"?, David Shaw
    • Re: Reference for "IETF name space"?, Michael Young
      • Re: Reference for "IETF name space"?, David Shaw
      • Re: Reference for "IETF name space"?, Michael Young
      • Re: Reference for "IETF name space"?, Thomas Roessler
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Reference for "IETF name space"?, vedaal
  • Re: Reference for "IETF name space"?, vedaal
• acceptable comment lines in between pgp header and message block, vedaal
  • Re: acceptable comment lines in between pgp header and message block, Michael Young
• ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, David Shaw
  • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, Brian M. Carlson
    • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, David Shaw
      • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, Derek Atkins
      • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, David Shaw
  • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, David Hopwood
    • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, Jon Callas
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, disastry
    • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, Werner Koch
  • Re: ASN.1 OID for TIGER/192, disastry
• security fixes (KDF, MDC->MAC)?, Trevor Perrin
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: security fixes (KDF, MDC->MAC)?, disastry
    • Re: security fixes (KDF, MDC->MAC)?, Werner Koch
  • RE: security fixes (KDF, MDC->MAC)?, Trevor Perrin
  • RE: security fixes (KDF, MDC->MAC)?, Trevor Perrin
• Re: Why ECC?, Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Why ECC?, Rodney Thayer
    • Re: Why ECC?, Michael Young
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Why ECC?, Peter Gutmann
• Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
  • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Jon Callas
    • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Werner Koch
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
  • Message not available
    • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Jon Callas
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Jon Callas
      • Message not available
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Werner Koch
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Jon Callas
    • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Derek Atkins
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • RE: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Richie Laager
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • RE: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Richie Laager
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • RE: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Richie Laager
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Len Sassaman
      • More on key expiration policy (Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt), Michael Young
      • Re: More on key expiration policy (Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt), Len Sassaman
      • Re: More on key expiration policy (Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt), Bodo Moeller
      • Re: More on key expiration policy (Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt), Bodo Moeller
      • Re: More on key expiration policy (Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt), David Shaw
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Jon Callas
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Derek Atkins
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Adrian von Bidder
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Michael Young
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Len Sassaman
      • Expiration semantics (Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt), Michael Young
      • Re: Expiration semantics (Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt), Bodo Moeller
  • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, disastry
    • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, David Shaw
  • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Michael Young
    • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, David Shaw
      • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Michael Young
  • Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Bodo Moeller
• Fixing the MDC language, Jon Callas
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Fixing the MDC language, Hal Finney
  • Re: Fixing the MDC language, John Kane
• RE: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Trevor Perrin
  • Re: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Michael Young
    • Re: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Jon Callas
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • RE: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Trevor Perrin
  • RE: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Trevor Perrin
  • RE: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Trevor Perrin
  • RE: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Trevor Perrin
  • RE: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Hal Finney
    • Re: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Jon Callas
  • RE: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Trevor Perrin
  • RE: [Cfrg] OpenPGP security analysis, Trevor Perrin
• S/MIME vulnerability, Hal Finney
• Nomcom call for volunteers, Paul Hoffman / IMC
• RFC: DSA key lengths; Elgamal type 16 v. type 20, Brian M. Carlson
  • Re: RFC: DSA key lengths; Elgamal type 16 v. type 20, Jon Callas
    • Re: RFC: DSA key lengths; Elgamal type 16 v. type 20, Werner Koch
    • Re: RFC: DSA key lengths; Elgamal type 16 v. type 20, Len Sassaman
      • Re: RFC: DSA key lengths; Elgamal type 16 v. type 20, Jon Callas
  • Message not available
    • Re: RFC: DSA key lengths; Elgamal type 16 v. type 20, Brian M. Carlson
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: RFC: DSA key lengths; Elgamal type 16 v. type 20, disastry
• possible new type of pgp plaintext attack ?, vedaal
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: possible new type of pgp plaintext attack ?, john . dlugosz
• CFP - Symposium on Network & Distributed Systems Security, Clifford Neuman
• Notary signature implementation notes, David Shaw
• Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, john . dlugosz
  • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Derek Atkins
    • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Rodney Thayer
      • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Derek Atkins
      • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Rodney Thayer
      • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Adam Back
      • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Carl Ellison
  • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Marc Mutz
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, john . dlugosz
    • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Jon Callas
      • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Lutz Donnerhacke
  • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Dominikus Scherkl
    • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder
    • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Werner Koch
    • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, David Hopwood
  • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Peter Gutmann
    • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder
  • Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?, Peter Gutmann
• Primary subkey subpacket, Timo Schulz
  • Re: Primary subkey subpacket, David Shaw
  • Re: Primary subkey subpacket, Werner Koch
    • RE: Primary subkey subpacket, Ian Brown
    • Re: Primary subkey subpacket, David Shaw
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Primary subkey subpacket, disastry
    • Re: Primary subkey subpacket, Timo Schulz
  • Re: Primary subkey subpacket, disastry
    • Re: Primary subkey subpacket, Timo Schulz
• I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Internet-Drafts
  • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Florian Weimer
    • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Jon Callas
      • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Florian Weimer
    • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Werner Koch
      • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Len Sassaman
      • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, David Shaw
      • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Michael Young
      • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, David Shaw
      • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Jon Callas
      • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, Werner Koch
      • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, David Shaw
  • Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt, David Shaw
• I-D ACTION:draft-josefsson-cert-openpgp-00.txt, Internet-Drafts
• Question about MDC Packets, Len Sassaman
  • Re: Question about MDC Packets, Jon Callas
    • Re: Question about MDC Packets, David Shaw
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Question about MDC Packets, Len Sassaman
    • Re: Question about MDC Packets, David Shaw
      • Re: Question about MDC Packets, Adam Back
• Is PGP Freeware v6.5.8 compatible with Windows XP?, g kare
  • Re: Is PGP Freeware v6.5.8 compatible with Windows XP?, Jon Callas
• draft-ietf-tls-openpgp-keys, Nikos Mavroyanopoulos
• photo support?, Simon Josefsson
  • Re: photo support?, vedaal
    • Re: photo support?, Michael Young
    • Re: photo support?, David Shaw
  • Re: photo support?, David Shaw
  • How to handle photoID on keyserver? (Re: photo support?), Hironobu SUZUKI
    • Re: How to handle photoID on keyserver? (Re: photo support?), David Shaw
    • Re: How to handle photoID on keyserver? (Re: photo support?), Michael Young
      • Re: How to handle photoID on keyserver? (Re: photo support?), David Shaw
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: photo support?, Hal Finney
• check out Islam Exposed.com at http://islamexposed.com, Bryan Morris
• Secret Key Packet Formats, 山本和彦
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Fw: Secret Key Packet Formats, 山本和彦
• Mailing List metaissue, john . dlugosz
• RE: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted P GP message is useless, Terje Braaten
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted P GP message is useless, Derek Atkins
• secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Hal Finney
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, vedaal
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, vedaal
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, vedaal
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Jon Callas
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, vedaal
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Hal Finney
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Jon Callas
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Peter Gutmann
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Matthew Byng-Maddick
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Dominikus Scherkl
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Matthew Byng-Maddick
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, David P. Kemp
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
  • Re: secure sign & encrypt, disastry
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, disastry
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Dominikus Scherkl
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Dominikus Scherkl
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Derek Atkins
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Michael Young
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Paul Hoffman / IMC
  • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Peter Gutmann
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
    • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Brian M. Carlson
      • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Jon Callas
  • Re: secure sign & encrypt, Adrian 'Dagurashibanipal' von Bidder
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, john . dlugosz
  • RE: secure sign & encrypt, Terje Braaten
• Dash-escaping clarification, David Shaw
  • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Jon Callas
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Dash-escaping clarification, David Shaw
    • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Jon Callas
    • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Michael Young
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, David Shaw
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Jeroen C. van Gelderen
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, David Shaw
    • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Adam Back
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Adam Back
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, David Shaw
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Adam Back
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Jeroen C. van Gelderen
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Michael Young
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, David Shaw
      • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Jeroen C. van Gelderen
  • RE: Dash-escaping clarification, Dominikus Scherkl
    • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Werner Koch
    • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, David Shaw
    • Re: Dash-escaping clarification, Jeroen C. van Gelderen
• How do I do this with OpenPGP?, john . dlugosz
  • Re: How do I do this with OpenPGP?, David Shaw
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: How do I do this with OpenPGP?, Hal Finney
  • Re: How do I do this with OpenPGP?, Hal Finney
  • Re: How do I do this with OpenPGP?, john . dlugosz
  • Re: How do I do this with OpenPGP?, john . dlugosz
• common modulus attack on RSA, john . dlugosz
  • Re: common modulus attack on RSA, Derek Atkins
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: common modulus attack on RSA, Hal Finney
• Clearsigned messages and MIME, Florian Weimer
  • Re: Clearsigned messages and MIME, Thomas Roessler
  • Re: Clearsigned messages and MIME, Marc Mutz
    • Re: Clearsigned messages and MIME, Florian Weimer
      • Re: Clearsigned messages and MIME, Marc Mutz
• bis05: Armor Headers, Marc Mutz
  • Re: bis05: Armor Headers, Werner Koch
  • Re: bis05: Armor Headers, David Shaw
• I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-05.txt, Internet-Drafts
• Musings on Notary signatures, john . dlugosz
  • Re: Musings on Notary signatures, vedaal
    • Re: Musings on Notary signatures, Jon Callas
      • Re: Musings on Notary signatures, vedaal
  • Re: Musings on Notary signatures, David Shaw
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Musings on Notary signatures, john . dlugosz
    • Re: Musings on Notary signatures, David Shaw
• Notary signatures, David Shaw
  • Re: Notary signatures, Len Sassaman
  • Re: Notary signatures, Jon Callas
    • Re: Notary signatures, David Shaw
      • Re: Notary signatures, Jon Callas
      • Re: Notary signatures, Len Sassaman
      • Re: Notary signatures, Jon Callas
      • Re: Notary signatures, Derek Atkins
      • Re: Notary signatures, David Shaw
      • Re: Notary signatures, Jon Callas
      • Re: Notary signatures, Len Sassaman
      • Re: Notary signatures, Werner Koch
      • Re: Notary signatures, David Shaw
      • Re: Notary signatures, Derek Atkins
      • Re: Notary signatures, Bill Frantz
      • Re: Notary signatures, Jon Callas
      • Re: Notary signatures, David Shaw
      • Timestamp Signatures (was Re: Notary signatures), Jon Callas
      • Re: Timestamp Signatures (was Re: Notary signatures), David Shaw
      • Re: Timestamp Signatures (was Re: Notary signatures), Jon Callas
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Notary signatures, Hal Finney
    • Re: Notary signatures, Jon Callas
    • Re: Notary signatures, David Shaw
  • Re: Notary signatures, Hal Finney
• New Draft Gone Out, Jon Callas
• Re: non-transferable sigs with hashes and encryption only (Re: Recipient-verifiable messages), Hal Finney
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • RE: non-transferable sigs with hashes and encryption only (Re: Recipient-verifiable messages), Dominikus Scherkl
• Whither comment packets?, David Shaw
  • Re: Whither comment packets?, Jon Callas
    • Re: Whither comment packets?, Werner Koch
      • Re: Whither comment packets?, Adam Back
• bis04: revocation key nits, David Shaw
  • Re: bis04: revocation key nits, Jon Callas
    • Re: bis04: revocation key nits, David Shaw
• What's left before a new RFC?, Jon Callas
  • Revocation target subpacket (Re: What's left before a new RFC?), Michael Young
    • Re: Revocation target subpacket (Re: What's left before a new RFC?), David Shaw
    • Re: Revocation target subpacket (Re: What's left before a new RFC?), Jon Callas
  • Re: What's left before a new RFC?, Marcel Waldvogel
    • Re: What's left before a new RFC?, Marc Mutz
      • Re: What's left before a new RFC?, Marcel Waldvogel
      • Re: What's left before a new RFC?, Marc Mutz
  • Re: What's left before a new RFC?, Florian Weimer
    • Re: What's left before a new RFC?, Jon Callas
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: What's left before a new RFC?, john . dlugosz
  • Re: What's left before a new RFC?, john . dlugosz
• sha-1 protected test key, Werner Koch
  • Re: sha-1 protected test key, Imad R. Faiad
    • Re: sha-1 protected test key, Timo Schulz
• bis04: Armor headers w/ non-us-ascii values, Marc Mutz
  • Re: bis04: Armor headers w/ non-us-ascii values, Thomas Roessler
• literal data packet tags - nit, Thomas Roessler
  • Re: literal data packet tags - nit, Jon Callas
• Clearsigning, MIME, etc., Jon Callas
  • Re: Clearsigning, MIME, etc., Thomas Roessler
    • Re: Clearsigning, MIME, etc., Jon Callas
      • Re: Clearsigning, MIME, etc., Thomas Roessler
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Clearsigning, MIME, etc., john . dlugosz
    • Re: Clearsigning, MIME, etc., Marc Mutz
  • Re: Clearsigning, MIME, etc., john . dlugosz
• Clearsigning considered harmful., Thomas Roessler
• Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, john . dlugosz
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, Hal Finney
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, john . dlugosz
• bis04, Werner Koch
  • Re: bis04, Jon Callas
    • Re: bis04, Thomas Roessler
      • Re: bis04, vedaal
      • Re: bis04, Thomas Roessler
      • Re: bis04, Paul Holman
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: bis04, john . dlugosz
    • Re: bis04, Jon Callas
  • Re: bis04, john . dlugosz
    • Re: bis04, David Shaw
• I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-04.txt, Internet-Drafts
• quasi-deniable signing, John Kane
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: quasi-deniable signing, Hal Finney
• Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Hal Finney
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, vedaal
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, Jon Callas
    • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, David P. Kemp
      • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, Jon Callas
      • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, David P. Kemp
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Adam Back
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, john . dlugosz
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, john . dlugosz
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Hal Finney
    • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Adam Back
    • non-transferable sigs with hashes and encryption only (Re: Recipient-verifiable messages), Adam Back
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Hal Finney
  • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Hal Finney
    • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Werner Koch
    • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Bodo Moeller
    • Message not available
      • Re: Recipient-verifiable messages, was: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Bodo Moeller
• re: forwarding an encrypted message, vedaal
  • Re: forwarding an encrypted message, Matthew Byng-Maddick
    • Re: forwarding an encrypted message, Ben Laurie
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • re: forwarding an encrypted message, john . dlugosz
    • Re: forwarding an encrypted message, vedaal
    • Re: forwarding an encrypted message, David Shaw
  • Re: forwarding an encrypted message, john . dlugosz
• Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Marc Mutz
  • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Arnt Gulbrandsen
  • RE: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Leon Kuunders
  • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Simon Josefsson
    • Re[2]: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Clinton E. Troutman
  • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Magnus von Koeller
  • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Keith Moore
    • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, ned . freed
      • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Marc Mutz
      • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Keith Moore
      • Message not available
      • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Marc Mutz
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, john . dlugosz
    • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Jon Callas
      • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Graham Klyne
    • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Paul Shields
      • Re: Bug#40394: forwarding an encrypted PGP message is useless, Derek Atkins

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