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- To: OPES WG <ietf-openproxy@xxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: ID Tracker State Update Notice: draft-ietf-opes-ocp-core
- From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 4 May 2004 00:40:14 -0600 (MDT)
- Cc: Markus Hofmann <markus@xxxxxxxx>
- In-reply-to: <Pine.BSF.4.58.0404291636410.48149@measurement-factory.com>
- References: <Pine.BSF.4.58.0404291636410.48149@measurement-factory.com>
On Thu, 29 Apr 2004, Alex Rousskov wrote: > > 'State Changes to IESG Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from IESG > > Evaluation by Amy Vezza' > > ID Tracker URL: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=10380&rfc_flag=0 > > There are two "discuss" items: > > 1) It isn't clear how encryption is turned on. > > I will need to polish the text to make it clear. I think the draft > lost some of the text that explicitly covered that when > security negotiation was put out of Core scope. Done. I have polished/added the following paragraphs and changed the negotiation example: 6. Negotiation ... Two core negotiation primitives are supported: negotiation offer and negotiation response. A Negotiation Offer (NO) message allows an agent to specify a set of features from which the responder has to select at most one feature it prefers. The selection is sent using a Negotiation Response (NR) message. If the response is positive, both sides assume that the selected feature is in effect immediately (see Section 11.19 for details). If the response is negative, no behavioral changes are assumed. In either case, further offers may follow. ... The following example shows a dialog with a callout server that insists on two imaginary features to be used: strong transport encryption and use of volatile storage for responses. The server is designed to exchange no sensitive messages until both features are enabled. Naturally, the volatile storage feature has to be negotiated securely. The OPES processor supports one of the strong encryption mechanisms but prefers not to offer (volunteer support for) strong encryption, perhaps for performance reasons. The server has to send a true "Offer-Pending" parameter to get a chance to offer strong encryption (which is successfully negotiated in this case). Any messages sent by either agent after the (only) successful NR response are encrypted with "strongB" encryption scheme. The OPES processor does not understand the volatile storage feature, and the last negotiation fails (over an strongly encrypted transport connection). P: NO ({"29:ocp://example/encryption/weak"}) ; S: NR Offer-Pending: true ; S: NO ({"32:ocp://example/encryption/strongA"},\ {"32:ocp://example/encryption/strongB"}) Offer-Pending: true ; P: NR {"32:ocp://example/encryption/strongB"} ; ... all traffic below is encrypted using strongB ... S: NO ({"31:ocp://example/storage/volatile"}) Offer-Pending: false ; P: NR Unknowns: ({"31:ocp://example/storage/volatile"}) ; S: CSE { 400 "33:lack of VolStore protocol support" } ; ... 11.19 Negotiation Response (NR) ... The successfully negotiated feature becomes effective immediately: The sender of a positive response MUST consider the corresponding feature enabled immediately after the response is sent; the recipient of a positive response MUST consider the corresponding feature enabled immediately after the response is received. Note that the scope of the negotiated feature application may be limited to a specified service group. The negotiation phase state does not affect enabling of the feature. > 2) Opening for future feature extension is too big. > > The comment that follows this vague statement seems to be > misinterpreting how the extension mechanism works. I will > polish the text and supply a specific example to make the > intent clear. I hope that will remove the "too big" > objection. Done. Here is the polished text: 15.1 Adapting OCP Core OCP extensions MAY change any normative requirement documented in this specification, including OCP message syntax, except for the following rule: OCP extensions MUST require that changes to normative parts of OCP Core are negotiated prior to taking effect. In other words, this specification defines compliant agent behavior until changes to this specifications (if any) are successfully negotiated. For example, if an RTSP profile for OCP requires support for sizes exceeding 2147483647 octets, the profile specification can document appropriate OCP message syntax and semantics changes while requiring that RTSP adaptation agents negotiate "large size" support before using large sizes. Such negotiation can be bundled with negotiating another feature (e.g., negotiating an RTSP profile may imply support for large sizes). As implied by the above rule, OCP extensions may dynamically alter the negotiation mechanism itself. Such an alternation would have to be negotiated first, using the negotiation mechanism defined by this specification. For example, successfully negotiating a feature might change the default "Offer-Pending" value from false to true. > There was also a comment regarding lack of IANA registrations. I am > guessing that the IANA-related text we discussed on this list (and > with AD) after the draft was published did not make it to IESG. I will > include that text into the next version of the draft. Done. The entire updated draft is available at http://www.measurement-factory.com/tmp/opes/ I would like to publish it in hope to close IESG discussion items. Please let me know if you have any other suggestions/ideas. Thanks, Alex.
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