I think NR claim ties to showing Lenstra paper and then showing that forcing
the subscriber to show the primes or private key to show that one of the
primes for a 2048 modulus is only 512 bits (should be around 1024 bits).
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix@xxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
Sent: Monday, March 07, 2005 3:36 AM
To: Santosh Chokhani
Cc: ietf-pkix@xxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [saag] X.509 certificate collision, via MD5 collisions
Santosh,
Some of us have suggested that the Lenstra attack does not break
non-repudiation. I would like to add another evidence for NR.
If there is a dispute between the signer and the relying party and the
signer (or CA) and the relying party produce two certificates
resulting in the same hash,
When RFC 3126 is used, then ESSCertID MUST be used as a signed attribute
which means that not only there MUST be the same hash value but also the
same CA DN and the same serial number.
ESSCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash Hash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}
Hash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA1 hash of entire certificate
IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer GeneralNames,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
}
Denis
signer could be required to produce further evidence for the modulii
and one would notice that one of the factors is 512 bits for 2048
modulus, something FIPS does not recommend. That would be viewed as
additional evidence of mischief by the subscriber.
Santosh Chokhani
Orion Security Solutions, Inc.
1489 Chain Bridge Road, Suite 300
McLean, Virginia 22101
(703) 917-0060 Ext. 35 (voice)
(703) 917-0260 (Fax)
chokhani@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Visit our Web site
http://www.orionsec.com