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RE: RSA Signature Padding
The thesis of the paper is that ad hoc encodings should be replaced with
Provably secure encodings, albeit the attack it describes may not apply
to PKCS 1 1.5.
One would think that we would want to use provable secure padding
specially as we use new OID.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Simon Josefsson [mailto:simon@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Monday, June 08, 2009 7:28 AM
> To: Santosh Chokhani
> Cc: Tom Gindin; IETF-pkix
> Subject: Re: RSA Signature Padding
>
> "Santosh Chokhani" <SChokhani@xxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > Tom,
> >
> > I am asking because of the paper in the link below.
> >
> > http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/203
>
> Interesting. What does that mean for PKCS#1 v1.5?
>
> /Simon
>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Tom Gindin [mailto:tgindin@xxxxxxxxxx]
> >> Sent: Sunday, June 07, 2009 8:54 PM
> >> To: Santosh Chokhani
> >> Cc: IETF-pkix
> >> Subject: Re: RSA Signature Padding
> >>
> >> Is "we" the right term? The latest TLS (RFC 5246 section
> >> 4.7) specifies RSA signatures but does not seem to permit
> PSS ones.
> >> PKIX at least has PSS in RFC 4055. We could encourage vendors by
> >> producing a consolidated "algorithms" RFC which deprecates
> the use of
> >> MD2 and MD5 for new certificates, while suggesting that
> any RP vendor
> >> supporting sha1WithRSAEncryption as a signatureAlgorithm
> SHOULD also
> >> support id-RSASSA-PSS. Are you suggesting that we should
> also tell
> >> people not to use sha256WithRSAEncryption,
> sha384WithRSAEncryption,
> >> or sha512WithRSAEncryption as signatureAlgorithm values but to use
> >> those hash algorithms as PSS parameters instead?
> >> Should such an RFC be targeted for New Year's 2011?
> >>
> >> Tom Gindin
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> "Santosh Chokhani" <SChokhani@xxxxxxxxxxxx> Sent by:
> >> owner-ietf-pkix@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> 06/03/2009 12:58 PM
> >>
> >> To
> >> "IETF-pkix" <ietf-pkix@xxxxxxx>
> >> cc
> >>
> >> Subject
> >> RSA Signature Padding
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I do not know if this is the right forum.
> >>
> >> Should we encourage vendors to use RSA PSS as we transition to
> >> SHA-256 given the weakness in PKCS 1.5 padding?
> >>
> >> Santosh Chokhani
> >> CygnaCom Solutions
> >>
> >> "Questioning conventional wisdom is key to innovation"
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
>