Antonio Lioy wrote: > This is another view: the CSL is being used as a waiting > list for possibly revoked certs. If it is later revoked, > then you'll put it in the CRL, otherwise you'll remove it > from the CSL. > > But I disagree with this view: if I temporarily lost control > of my smart-card, I can never know what has happened during > that period of time. Yes, but I think that if you are not sure about some misusage of the private key, then you should request it to be revoked. This is for two reasons: the first is about how long a CSL will become if we keep track about every suspension of certificates and the second is about your trusting in your key-pair. If we keep every suspension tracked on the CSL, it can get a very long list and it could suffer from problems related to this aspect (distribution, definition of delta's CSL, and so on... ). I'd like to avoid these problems as them tend to get the CSL more complex than needed. The second aspect is related on the fact that if you do not trust your key for a certain period, than you should not trust it at all because it could be open to every kind of attacks: let's say someone discovers your password and uses it non only when it is suspended, but he/her can get in touch with your key during the working time when you are having a coffe-break... If you are now trusting your key it is possible you think that the 5 mins of a coffe break do not represent a real danger... So my vision is: if you trust your certificate is because it has never been in danger, if there is a possibility your certificate (read key-pair) has been compromised (so it con be compromised again...) either if you are not sure about it, than you should revoke it... So if we do not keep track on the CSLs about the suspension of non-revoked certificates is because them are to be trusted. > May be two years later someone claims money from me, based > on a digital signature produced during that exact period of > time. If you removed the entry from the CSL, you'll not be > able to prove that it was not you that signed that document. > > Do you agree? I do understand your point of view, but how to solve problems related to the CSL's length ?? And, moreover, how to be sure your certificate is subject to attacks only in suspension times ?? Once a key/pair has been compromised (or possibily compromised) it should not, to me, being trusted any more. What do you think about this ??? C'you, Massimiliano Pala (madwolf@openca.org)
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