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RE: Authority Key Identifier
Thank you all for the (quick) responses. I now have a better feeling of the
AKI. The suggested books/artickes are taken into consideration.
We need the AKI to be able to select the proper RA/CA combination for a
Certificate Roll-over. MS IIS will do this selection using an ISAPI
filter/extension. After the proper RA/CA are selected, RSA Keon will perform
a certificate update.
Met vriendelijke groet/with kind regards,
Dennis 't Jong
Technisch Specialist
Windows Server Management O&O - Beveiliging
Rabobank ICT Tel: +31 30 21 52772
Kamer ZL-R255 Fax: +31 30 21 51893
Laan van Eikenstein 9 Mobiel: +31 6 24481180
3705 AR Zeist Email: D.Jong@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Web: http://www.RabobankICT.nl
> -----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
> Van: Hamrick, Matt [mailto:HamrickM@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Verzonden: woensdag 23 oktober 2002 16:19
> Aan: 'Jong 't, D (Dennis)'
> CC: 'ietf-pkix@xxxxxxx'
> Onderwerp: RE: Authority Key Identifier
>
>
> Also... as a followup to Denis' response, you can find
> information about
> ASN.1 and BER encoding in the X.680 family of specifications.
> Burt Kalliski
> has also authored an article titled "a layman's guide to
> ASN.1" You can
> search google or cryptonomicon.net to find the URLs for these
> articles. As a
> fyi, most ITU specs cost money, but they allow people to
> download two or
> three without charge each year. If you're going to spend
> money trying to
> figure out ASN.1 and BER (and you really should figure these
> things out if
> you have to do serious certificate work,) there are a couple
> of books on
> ASN.1 I saw referenced on cryptonomicon.net. I think you
> could go there or
> amazon.com and search for "ASN.1". I think I saw the book by Olivier
> Dubuisson and thought it was a reasonable introduction to the subject.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jong 't, D (Dennis) [mailto:D.Jong@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Monday, October 21, 2002 7:29 AM
> To: 'ietf-pkix@xxxxxxx'
> Subject: Authority Key Identifier
>
>
>
> LS,
>
> I have a question regarding the Authority Key Identifier
> (AKI) in an x509
> certificate. When we resolve the AKI from the "CERT_CONTEXT"
> (MS IIS), it
> returns a 24 bytes structure, like:
> 30 16 80 14 b2 b6 f2 cb eb d0 b2 26 79 eb 8b 99 74 77 e2 df
> 2f d5 20 69
>
> The AKI should be 20 bytes long (RFC 2459, 4.2.1.2 using 160
> bit SHA-1),
> like:
> b2 b6 f2 cb eb d0 b2 26 79 eb 8b 99 74 77 e2 df 2f d5 20 69
>
> Does anyone know the purpose of those 4 trailing bytes? If
> Yes, is it save
> to cut them off to substract the original AKI?
>
> Met vriendelijke groet/with kind regards,
>
> Dennis 't Jong
> Technisch Specialist
> Windows Server Management O&O - Beveiliging
>
> Rabobank ICT Tel: +31 30 21 52772
> Kamer ZL-R255 Fax: +31 30 21 51893
> Laan van Eikenstein 9 Mobiel: +31 6 24481180
> 3705 AR Zeist Email: D.Jong@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Nederland Web: http://www.RabobankICT.nl
>
>
>
>
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================================================
De informatie opgenomen in dit bericht kan vertrouwelijk zijn en
is uitsluitend bestemd voor de geadresseerde. Indien u dit bericht
onterecht ontvangt, wordt u verzocht de inhoud niet te gebruiken en
de afzender direct te informeren door het bericht te retourneren.
================================================
The information contained in this message may be confidential
and is intended to be exclusively for the addressee. Should you
receive this message unintentionally, please do not use the contents
herein and notify the sender immediately by return e-mail.