While it might make sense for a client to only ask for revocation checking if the client could specify the certification path, it does not seem to make sense given that the server chooses the certification path for which revocation status checking will be performed. If the client wants to specify a set of certificates for which it only wants to know the revocation status, that is what OCSP is for.Hi Seth, A server can always go beyond what the client asked for. I don't see that as strictly necessary in all cases such as if the client just asks for revocation. Untimely is a matter of local server policy. What the server cannot do is return status or errors relating to the other activities which were beyond the request scope. Trevor
* -----Original Message-----
* From: Seth Hitchings [mailto:shitchings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
* Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 11:34 AM
* To: Trevor Freeman
* Cc: ietf-pkix@xxxxxxx
* Subject: RE: SCVP 16 comments deadline
* * Trevor,
* * For clarification, I assume that doing revocation status checks on a path
* implies building
* a validated path?
* * If I am correct, in what case would a client ever send more than one
* check?
* * Seth
* * -----Original Message-----
* From: owner-ietf-pkix@xxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@xxxxxxxxxxxx]
* On Behalf Of
* Trevor Freeman
* Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 1:42 PM
* To: Denis Pinkas
* Cc: ietf-pkix@xxxxxxx
* Subject: RE: SCVP 16 comments deadline
* * * Denis,
* I know of several systems who's policy is never to revoke the identity
* certificate because
* they have other mechanisms to address the issue.
* They are using authorization bound to the identity and they either rely on
* short lived
* authorization assertions or revoke the authorization privilege assonated
* with the
* identity. Therefore in those cases not checking the revocation status of
* the certificate
* makes perfect sense.
* Trevor
* * * -----Original Message-----
* * From: owner-ietf-pkix@xxxxxxxxxxxx
* [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix@xxxxxxxxxxxx]
* * On Behalf Of Denis Pinkas
* * Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2004 8:01 AM
* * To: Trevor Freeman
* * Cc: ietf-pkix@xxxxxxx
* * Subject: Re: SCVP 16 comments deadline
* *
* *
* * Trevor,
* *
* * > Hi Denis,
* * > Below are responses to 1-16. Others will follow later.
* *
* * I am pleased that you accepted comments 13, 14, 15 and 16.
* * Among this list, I have a further remark on comment 4.
* *
* * > * 4. Page 13. Typo. Section 3.1.2 "checks"
* * > * The two following lines are in fact one line:
* * > *
* * > * Change:
* * > *
* * > * - Build a validated certification path to a trust anchor; and
* * > *
* * > * - Do revocation status checks on the certification path.
* * > *
* * > * into:
* * > *
* * > * - Build a validated certification path to a trust anchor and
* * > * do revocation status checks on the certification path.
* * > *
* * > [TF] Since this paragraph is listing the possible checks and building
* a
* * > path is a separate check to revocation checking, I think the current
* * > text is more accurate.
* *
* * I agree that "building a path is a separate check to revocation
* checking",
* * but revocation checking without building a validated path does not make
* * sense.
* *
* * The full text currently is:
* *
* * - Build a certification path to a trust anchor;
* *
* * - Build a validated certification path to a trust anchor; and
* *
* * - Do revocation status checks on the certification path.
* *
* * The full text should be:
* *
* * - Build a certification path to a trust anchor;
* *
* * - Build a validated certification path to a trust anchor; and
* * do revocation status checks on the certification path.
* *
* * Denis
*