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RE(2): Last Call (CMP proof-of-possession)
- To: " (David P. Kemp)" <dpkemp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: RE(2): Last Call (CMP proof-of-possession)
- From: <T.A.Parker@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 7 Oct 1997 10:22:50 +0100
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- Cc: ietf-pkix@xxxxxxxxxx
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David Kemp said:
>Now that we are in last call, I'd like a straw poll to measure the
>degree of consensus for REQUIRING Proof-of-Possession for PKIX-compliant
>CAs. If there is general agreement, PoP can be returned to its
>original REQUIRED status without delaying the RFC.
I'd like to support him in his proposal to make POP mandatory. As I've
already emailed, I believe that the CA should be considered to be
actually making a binding between the owner and the private key. The
certificate should be saying: "this name owns the private key corresponding
to the public key in this certificate". Without POP, all the certificate
says is: "This name wishes to be associated with the public key in the
certificate; the corresponding private key may however belong to someone
else" - very useful :-(.
I'm also concerned that individuals might be spoofed into
presenting the wrong public key value to the CA when requesting a
certificate, or the request may be tampered with en route, so that the
malicious private key owner who substituted his/her own public key can
then masquerade as the individual.
If you (a CA) are making a guaranteed binding between two values, both
need to be authenticated for the guarantee to be worth anything.
Tom Parker
ICL
UK.