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Re: [IETF-PKIX] OCSP v CRLs over HTTP
Marc,
My interpretation of your requirement implies the CA operate in a fashion
that enables the "false revocation" attack Carlisle earlier identified. I
may be misunderstanding your requiremment however. May I ask that you
express it more precisely?
Mike
At 11:07 AM 12/8/97 -0800, Marc Branchaud wrote:
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>
>On Fri, 5 Dec 1997 mmyers@verisign.com wrote:
>>
>> >OCSP allows the relier to get the revocation information when it's needed,
>> >without being subject to the CA's CRL schedule. Because CRLs can only be
>> >released periodically, they are at best a compromise solution to the needs
>> >of relying parties.
>>
>> Keep in mind there's still a periodicity effect in the event of caching.
>> Section 2.3 of the current draft sets out the requirements.
>>
>
>Agreed. One of my main points, though, is that relying parties need to be
>able to override any caches (& their effects) at their discretion, not the
>CA's or anyone else's.
>
>>
>> Again, I completely agree. However, we must be cautious about overly
>> constraining implementors. We can and should standardize what's
>> standarizable.
>>
>
>Perhaps, but is it really overconstraining to make implementors create
>something that works? To make an analogy, there are some unavoidable
>constraints to building an airplane -- don't make the wings cylinders,
>don't make the engines face each other, etc. Airplane implementors are
>constrained to create planes that fly. Similarly, we should constrain PKI
>implementors to make programs that work. If we are aware of any flaws in
>the standards we create, we should at the very least describe them in the
>documents themselves. I would prefer not standardizing a flawed system at
>all, but if there's a huge need to push forward then so be it.
>
> Marc
>
>+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
> Marc Branchaud \/
> Chief PKI Architect /\CERT SOFTWARE INC.
> marcnarc@xcert.com PKI References page: www.xcert.com
> 604-640-6227 www.xcert.com/~marcnarc/PKI/
>+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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