Re: [IETF-PKIX] OCSP v CRLs over HTTP

[Marc Branchaud <marcnarc@xxxxxxxxx>]

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On Tue, 9 Dec 1997 mmyers@verisign.com wrote:
> 
> Marc,
> 
> My interpretation of your requirement implies the CA operate in a fashion
> that enables the "false revocation" attack Carlisle earlier identified.  I
> may be misunderstanding your requiremment however.  May I ask that you
> express it more precisely?
> 
> Mike
> 

I don't remember the specifics about Carlisle's attack, and the archive on
ftp.tandem.com seems to end in September.  Could you give me a brief
refresher?

		Marc

+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
 Marc Branchaud                                       \/
 Chief PKI Architect                                  /\CERT SOFTWARE INC.
 marcnarc@xcert.com        PKI References page:              www.xcert.com
 604-640-6227          www.xcert.com/~marcnarc/PKI/
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  PGP key fingerprint:  60 11 4B 9D 4E E5 2F 47  BD C5 C2 BF 26 DF 5A E1

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