[IETF-PKIX] Definition of Secure Initialization

[Michael Myers <mmyers@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

All,


At 10:28 AM 4/14/98 -0700, Warwick wrote:
>>(2) Carlisle Adams noted that secure initialization is not a feature of
>>CMC. After some discussion, there was a straw poll. The sense of the group
>>was that secure initialization should be feature of CMS and should be
>>mandatory to implement. This requirement can be supported using the CRMF
>>message format discussed above.

Recall that we had defined secure initialization as the combination of two
mechanisms: out of band distribution of a trusted public key and out of
band distribution of a pre-authentication token.

As a consequence of some discussions and further thought on our L.A.
discussion, it's clear that latter is overly specific.  It is a mechanism,
not a requirement.  What is required is a high degree of confidence that
the attributes claimed by a certificate applicant are indeed held by that
applicant.

There are three mechanisms by which this assurance can be provided:

1. Use of a pre-authentication token as noted.

2. Use of an LRA's digital signature.

3. Correlation of claimed identity with externally reliable identification
information (two photo IDs, reference

The first two involve technical mechanisms of the protocol.  The third
mechanism is purely operational.

Comments anyone?  Otherwise I'm inclined to require a response to the
requirement as stated but leave the choice of mechanism optional.

The obvious observation is:  We need at least one to ensure
interoperability.  But how do we chose which one, assuming all are equally
responsive mechanisms to the requirement?  One way of making that decision
is to weigh the ease of implementation and deployment.