RE: Attribute used to store cached certificate chains?

[Tony Bartoletti <azb@xxxxxxxx>]

>> The only way you can _ensure_ "sufficient separation" of these duties
>> is
>> with an "air gap" and guards with guns.  One cannot rely upon "company
>> policy" that these duties remain separate and inviolable.
>>   
>	logic error detected here :-)
>	But having implemented air gaps and putting guards with guns
>around them must have been directed by a company policy.

OK, point taken :)

I guess they would have to be MY guards and guns (and they won't go for that)
so I would settle for having these global resources provide highly reliable
access to (potentially) "named opaque blobs".  Then no breach of internal
separations is a problem.  As long as the parties-at-risk are the only ones
who can make use of a blob, then there should be no objection to centralized
directory services.  I suppose it was Bob's comments about where he might
or might not keep his (unencrypted) secret key that set me off.

(Reducing to DefCon level 5)

___tony___
 

___tony___



Tony Bartoletti                                             LL
SPI-NET GURU                                             LL LL
Computer Security Technology Center                   LL LL LL
Lawrence Livermore National Lab                       LL LL LL
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