Re: QC Bio-info leak?

[Lynn.Wheeler@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]

note in the AADS strawman case ... the fingerprint sensor can be configured  on
the card and it used to activate the card ... in-place of PIN activation (with
bio information never appearing in the infrastructure).

the AADS w/PIN activation was what was announced at BAI this past week (BAI show
is sort of the world-wide retail banking equivalent of cebit).  the AADS
strawman also allows that the authentication function doesn't have to only
appear in card formfactor ... that contactless/wireless protocol would allow for
formfactor agnostic configurations.

one of the challenges has been use in unfamiliar/unknown POS-like environments

also within X9 ... there has been quite a bit of progress w/X9.84 (Management
and Security For The Biometrics Financial Services Industry) in conjunction with
various world-wide biometric standards organizations.

as alwas ... references at http:/www.garlic.com/~lynn/






"Anders Rundgren" <anders.rundgren@jaybis.com> on 12/11/99 11:48:36 PM

To:   "PKIX-List" <ietf-pkix@imc.org>
cc:    (bcc: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC)
Subject:  QC Bio-info leak?



All,
I have another question for you smart-card experts.

I believe that biometrics as defined by the current QC-draft (002) will in 99%
be used
in conjunction with smart cards.

Q: How do you anticipate that the bio-template is going to be protected without
also requiring that the RP software is authenticating to the card?    The latter
will IMO not scale that well.

Or is there another genial solution?

My own solution to the problem is to never put "naked" smart cards in unknown
readers,
but to have them (or it) in a pesonal security terminal.  In my case the mobile
phone.

Anders