RE: [MMUSIC] Thinking about best-effort encryption

["Dan Wing" <dwing@xxxxxxxxx>]

> Regardless of which key management protocol we ultimately
> choose, we need to sort the fundamental architectural issue of:
> 
>    Does the signalling (SDP) have to reflect RTP/SAVP?

This isn't just a question applicable to security -- this question is
also applicable to all other RTP profiles with offer/answer, such as
sending an offer where you want the RTP feedback profile (RTP/AVPF) if
the answerer supports it, otherwise you will accept RTP without
feedback (RTP/AVP).

Applicable to security, I expect RTP/AVPFCC
(draft-ietf-avt-tfrc-profile-06.txt) will also need an RTP/SAVPFCC
profile (it handwaves at such a thing in its section 3.  Eventually
there will be a profile for running RTP directly over DCCP, too
(without UDP, as is done by draft-ietf-avt-tfrc-profile-06).

We desperately need one solution for RTP profiles to be 
negotiated in SDP.

-d

> If the answer to this question is "Yes", then we either need to:
> 
> 1. Have some convenient way to offer multiple profiles (Flemming's
>    draft surveys the space of options here).
> 2. Do an UPDATE with RTP/SAVP for every secure connection. I get
>    the impression people find this distasteful.
> 
> If the answer is "No", then you can simplify the offer/answer exchange
> by having the signal that you will do security in an a-line, 
> but at the
> cost of having the profile no longer reflect what's on the wire.
> 
> In either case, it seems like deciding this architectural issue is
> something we need to do before we spend a lot of time discussing
> the details of mechanisms.
> 
> -Ekr
> 
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