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Re: pre-established key mode as additional requirement?


Since the biggest requirement is for Internet operation, I would
say a MAY.  There will be only one MUST I would expect, and
that would be the default authentication mode for the Internet.
That's what we're after, isn't it?

Mark
On Feb 20, 2007, at 10:13 AM, Dan Wing wrote:




It seems eminently reasonable to support key management schemes for
rtpsec that can leverage cached/stored keying material from prior
sessions to derive new keys for the current session without
requiring expensive cryptographic authentication operations.

Are you thinking of this as a MAY, a SHOULD, or a MUST?
It feels like a MAY or SHOULD, because it is 'merely' an optimization, and 
requires a trade-off of state storage (how long do you keep this
information) versus computational effort.

I would like to hear others expectations.


Would you consider the TLS "session restart" machinery as qualifying
to meet this requirement?


Yes, I expect so.

-d