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Re: DTLS-SRTP harming GETS [was RE: Additional use cases? (Re: Plan for moving forward)]
Francois,
We don't make decisions at a meeting in the IETF.
We definitely didn't say that DTLS-SRTP cannot be changed. If you
recall, change control was a big part of the arguments at the meeting.
I am not (cannot) stopping anyone from making progress. I am simply
presenting a use case and seeking clarification on why some properties
are more important than others. In some systems, optimization of
computational and communication overhead is important. If we have to
sacrifice some security properties, as long as the risks are well
understood, it should be allowed (that's one of the reasons we have the
security considerations section).
The necessary question to ask is what security properties are considered
crucial to all use cases and why. That is an important discussion to
have. One of the lessons from history is that IKE main mode had some
properties people didn't care for, that made the quick mode popular and
subsequently in IKEv2 we got rid of some of those properties in the
interest of fewer RTs. Now of course, IKEv2 effort was motivated by a
lot of other reasons too.
regards,
Lakshminath
On 6/13/2007 8:57 AM, Francois Audet wrote:
The only argument against that I see so far is that
DTLS-SRTP is the
chosen protocol and the chosen protocol must not be changed.
Didn't we agree on this at the last meeting?
Isn't it time to move on?