RE: Media Security Requirements Draft: New Requirement

["Dan Wing" <dwing@xxxxxxxxx>]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Christer Holmberg (JO/LMF) 
> [mailto:christer.holmberg@xxxxxxxxxxxx] 
> Sent: Wednesday, June 27, 2007 2:45 PM
> To: Dan Wing; Hannes Tschofenig; ietf-rtpsec@xxxxxxx
> Subject: RE: Media Security Requirements Draft: New Requirement
> 
> 
> Hi, 
> 
> >>The main point is that I am telling how many networks 
> (again, it's not
> 
> >> IMS specific) work today.
> > 
> >I agree the problems are not specific to RTPSEC.  SIP doesn't 
> >consider this stuff, neither does AVT.  IETF doesn't give 
> >much thought to firewalls or anything that blocks packets.
> > 
> >>But, if we don't want to take that into consideration I 
> would suggest 
> >>that we clearly state, in order to avoiding having similar 
> discussions
> 
> >>in the future, that the mechanism we are working on may not be
> applicable to networks where these kind of functions 
> >>exist.
> > 
> >As this isn't specific to RTPSEC (this isn't the place to 
> discuss it),
> why burden only RTPSEC with this?  It implies 
> >that only RTPSEC keying will break, when in reality other SIP things
> will break.
> 
> I don't see it as a burden, and I don't think it implies that 
> there may
> not be problems elsewhere.

I expect most would consider breaking ICE to be a problem,
especially as it's the only mechanism that will work on any
network for NAT traversal (unlike UPnP, NSIS, etc.).

> I see it as a clarification of the scope and
> applicability of the mechanism we're working on in RTPSEC.

-d