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Re: AD Review for draft-ietf-sasl-gssapi-xx.txt




Alexey Melnikov wrote:

  5) If the underlying cryptographic technology used by a mechanism
        supports data integrity, then the mechanism specification MUST
        integrity protect the transmission of an authorization identity
        and the negotiation of the security layer.

I think the resolution here is to always require the integrity flag be set.

You mean passing integ_req_flag=true to GSS_Init_sec_context?

This would be fine with me, however this is not the existing practice (e.g. Cyrus SASL only passes this flag when it also negotiates the SASL security layer with integrity protection).

After the followup conversation with Sam he convinced me that this is the right thing.

OLD text:
  If the client will be requesting a security
  layer, it MUST also supply to the GSS_Init_sec_context a
  mutual_req_flag of TRUE, a sequence_req_flag of TRUE, and an
  integ_req_flag of TRUE.  If the client will be requesting a security
  layer providing confidentiality protection, it MUST also supply to
  the GSS_Init_sec_context a conf_req_flag of TRUE.

NEW text:

 When calling the GSS_Init_sec_context the client MUST
pass the integ_req_flag of TRUE. If the client will be requesting a security
 layer, it MUST also supply to the GSS_Init_sec_context a
 mutual_req_flag of TRUE, and a sequence_req_flag of TRUE.
 If the client will be requesting a security
 layer providing confidentiality protection, it MUST also supply to the
 GSS_Init_sec_context a conf_req_flag of TRUE.