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Re: AD Review for draft-ietf-sasl-gssapi-xx.txt
Alexey Melnikov wrote:
5) If the underlying cryptographic technology used by a mechanism
supports data integrity, then the mechanism specification MUST
integrity protect the transmission of an authorization identity
and the negotiation of the security layer.
I think the resolution here is to always require
the integrity flag be set.
You mean passing integ_req_flag=true to GSS_Init_sec_context?
This would be fine with me, however this is not the existing practice
(e.g. Cyrus SASL only passes this flag when it also negotiates the
SASL security layer with integrity protection).
After the followup conversation with Sam he convinced me that this is
the right thing.
OLD text:
If the client will be requesting a security
layer, it MUST also supply to the GSS_Init_sec_context a
mutual_req_flag of TRUE, a sequence_req_flag of TRUE, and an
integ_req_flag of TRUE. If the client will be requesting a security
layer providing confidentiality protection, it MUST also supply to
the GSS_Init_sec_context a conf_req_flag of TRUE.
NEW text:
When calling the GSS_Init_sec_context the client MUST
pass the integ_req_flag of TRUE. If the client will be requesting a
security
layer, it MUST also supply to the GSS_Init_sec_context a
mutual_req_flag of TRUE, and a sequence_req_flag of TRUE.
If the client will be requesting a security
layer providing confidentiality protection, it MUST also supply to the
GSS_Init_sec_context a conf_req_flag of TRUE.