RE: Security

[Paul Leach <paulle@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Lots of snips in what's quoted below, but I agree with Sam, and add that if CRADM-MD5 doesn't have channel binding capabilities, then the weaknesses he cites _can not_ be fixed by using TLS. (As recent DefCon talks have shown with other protocols.)

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-sasl@xxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-ietf-sasl@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Simon Josefsson
Sent: Wednesday, August 13, 2008 9:19 AM
To: Sam Hartman
Cc: Kurt Zeilenga; Frank Ellermann; ietf-sasl@xxxxxxx
Subject: Re: Security


Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@xxxxxxx> writes:

>
> However for challenge/response mechanisms we can get mutual
> authentication and tie the mutual authentication to integrity
> protection and/or confidentiality.  Since cram-md5 does not support
> these capabilities either through security layers or channel binding,
>  I do not think it should be updated on the standards track.
>
We disagree on the principal here.  Merely because there are known
vulnerabilities (which can be fixed by using TLS), that shouldn't
prevent something to go on the standards track...