Jim,
> If we adopted the solution you gave, what limits me from making > arbitrary statements about who I am in this field that then need to be
> independently verified by the receipt processing code? (I.e. what if > I put the fact that I am turners@xxxxxxxx in this field and sign with > my jimsch@xxxxxxxxxx certificate).
First off, having looked in more detail at 2634 it implicitly requires each mail list to have its own certificate. In particular, the EntityIdentifier, used in MLExpansionHistory, refers only to a certificate. So having a single certificate for an MLA supporting multiple lists would cause the loop detection algorithm to fail.
So what I was looking at (a single certificate for a mail list agent supporting multiple lists) is a more fundamental change than I first thought.
But back to your question.
The basic answer is that nothing would limit you. Do you see this as a major issue?
x400wrap has a similar case where the content being signed contains an "originator" field.
"Receiving agents SHOULD check that the originator address in the X.400 content matches an X.400 address in the signer's certificate, if X.400 addresses are present in the certificate and an originator address is available in the content. A receiving agent SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the message if this comparison fails, which may be to display a message that shows the recipient the addresses in the certificate or other certificate details."
I think that similar wording to section 4.3 of this draft may be acceptable?
This wording allows us to take our own action to correlate the x400 originator to the signer in the case that they don't match (we use attribute certificates to do the signer to originator validation).
So for your example, I may see something like:
"signed receipt from jimsch@xxxxxxxxxx on behalf of turners@xxxxxxxx at <time>"
The receiptFrom field I proposed is primarily aimed at supporting the correlation of the signed receipt to the original recipient by providing original address the signed receipt was requested from.
There are a number of reasons why I may not be able to match the address[es] (subjectAltName) from the certificate to one of the addresses I to:
a) Valid aliases not in the subjectAltNames of the certificate
b) Signed receipt from a recipient who received the message as a result of ML expansion.
c) Mail redirections - e.g. sent to "ceo@xxxxxxxx" which redirects to a personal mailbox. Similar to a).
Graeme
> > -----Original Message----- > > From: owner-ietf-smime@xxxxxxxxxxxx > > [mailto:owner-ietf-smime@xxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Graeme Lunt > > Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2003 12:40 AM > > To: 'Sean P. Turner' > > Cc: 'ietf-smime' > > Subject: RE: Signed Receipts and Mail Lists > > > > > > > > Sean, > > > > > I'm not sure that the MLA returns a receipt on behalf of the ML > > > members. > > > > OK - if an MLA should not return signed receipts then there is not a
> > problem with my scenario. > > > > > I looked through ESS again and I couldn't find anything > > that said if a > > > message enters an MLA with a signed receipt request that it > > > > > shouldn't or should return a receipt. > > > > Is an MLA considered a "receiving agent"/"receiving > > software"/"processing software" in section 2.3 of ESS? I had assumed
> > that it was but agree it is unclear. > > > > > Typically (I think), originators want to know that the > > final recipient > > got > > > the message not whether the MLA got it. > > > > I think there are arguments for both. If an originator > sends a message > > to: > > > > complaints@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > the originator probably only wants to know that it got to the > > complaints department at bigbank. The originator doesn't want to > > know (and bigbank doesn't want to let the originator know) which > > individuals within bigbank read the message. > > > > > Then again maybe I didn't understand your scenario. > > > > I don't think the originator needs to understand if the addresses > > they are requesting signed receipts from are address lists or not. > > If an originator sends a message to two recipients - one a mail > > list, one an individual - and requests first tier signed receipts, > > they will never receive a signed receipt from the mail list > > recipient. The user may find this unexpected. Correlation software > > *may* be able to detect a mail list recipient and handle it > > appropriately. > > > > > > Graeme > > > > > >