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Subject: RE: [TLS] comment on null encryption ciphersuite; https RFC amendment ...to compensate
Date: Sun, 19 Nov 2006 11:32:51 -0500
From: uri.blumenthal@xxxxxxxxx
To: home_pw@xxxxxxx; tls@xxxxxxxx
Peter,
Whether you like it or not, but (a) there are applications that are OK with authentication/integrity only, and more importantly (b) some legistations and domains forbid encrypted channels, period. To address this reality, authentication-only TLS protocol suites are introduced. Their applicability is clear and limited - exactly as explicitly specified in the document.
Political balance and issues should be brought to US Congress and corresponding foreign bodies.
P.S. Perhaps it is worth to ensure that GUI unambiguously differentiates between encrypted and authenticated-only channel. If so, I bet you that Firefox will be there before MS IE. :-)
I'm EXTREMELY worried socially about an IAB-endorsement of the null encryption ciphersuite for TLS. Whilst I recognize its value, on the stated merits, I think we need a political balance addressing issues beyond IETF's scope. Too many consumers are potentially going to be duped by the millions of well-meant but potentially incorrect e-commerce website representations which today affirm that "SSL protects your credit-card data (via encryption etc)". With the use of endorsed null encryption ciphersuites in TLS/SSL, that is obviously not true (in any way grandma would understand). The average consumer is trained to assume "SSL" (or TLS) protects your from obvious criminal activities, concerning pilfering credit card numbers. IAB activities that destroy the brand name of SSL is something which is not worth the value of endorsing the null-encryption ciphersuite, in my own view.
Perhaps the right balance for IAB/IESG is to to require that the https RFC be simultaneously modified so that it makes it NON-CONFORMING for SSL/TLS in the https context to ever use the null encryption ciphersuites. Other URL protocols can be registered with IANA that don't confuse consumers (e.g. httpnos://1.1.1.1.6.5.4.2.0.2.enum.att.com/), which can even behave exactly as https v.10 otherwise does, but allowing for a conforming use of the null-encryption cipher suite.
Peter
From: home_pw@xxxxxxx
To: tls@xxxxxxxx
Subject: RE: [TLS] IETF67 TLS Summary
Date: Sat, 18 Nov 2006 09:53:44 -0800
CC:
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