RE: [TLS] Comments on TLS identity protection

[Peter Williams <home_pw@xxxxxxx>]

> > There's no way in TLS to currently have a NULL MAC algorithm.
> > I doubt there is lilkely to be one soon.
 
if we look at the text of SSLv3, it discussed null mac functions in the architecture:-
 
If the CipherSuite is SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, encryption consists of the identity 
operation (i.e., the data is not encrypted and the MAC size is zero implying that 
no MAC is used). SSLCiphertext.length is SSLCompressed.length plus 
CipherSpec.hash_size. 
 
I'd claim that a complete, SSL-patent implementing state machine (E.g TLS ) therefore
supports null MAC algorithms. As TLS implies SSLv3 fallback capability...the capability needs
to be provided to be complete. I think we can allow for "no MAC is used" (spec) to be equivalent to 
"NULL MAC algorithm" (peter-speak), linguistically.
 
if we consider
 
"The encryption and MAC algorithms are set to SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL at the beginning of the SSL 
Handshake Protocol,  indicating that no message authentication or encryption is performed. The handshake 
protocol is used to negotiate a more secure CipherSpec and to generate cryptographic keys. "
 
So perhaps the truthful political-appropriate statement would be that https (vs TLS) supports NULL 
MAC (as https tends to include the SSLv3 fallback modes of TLS)

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