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Re: [TLS] Please discuss: draft-housley-evidence-extns-00<
see inserted:
----- Original Message -----
From: "Martin Rex" <martin.rex@xxxxxxx>
To: "Mark Brown" <mark@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <tls@xxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, January 04, 2007 3:49 PM
Subject: Re: [TLS] Please discuss: draft-housley-evidence-extns-00<
> Mark Brown wrote:
> >
> > Isn't this attack possible with today's web sales? I mean, once you
give
> > your credit card to anyone, can't they ring you out at any price they
want?
> > You don't need a website or TLS to do this attack. You can do this on
the
> > phone or via mail order.
> >
> > So in the case of TLS Evidence, you both have a record of (1,499,999.-)
> > instead of what the buyer thought, (99,999.-). So what? In both cases
the
> > buyer cancels the order. You don't need TLS Evidence to cancel...with
> > either the merchant or by contacting your credit card issuer.
>
> No I am confused.
>
> Since you just completely disclaimed the usefulness of TLS evidence
> for just about every business application, what's left?
I have more "disclaimers": at least in US and at least one big b2b exchange
said that they have a simple non-repudiation practice:
they make customers (buyers and sellers) to sign the agreement that
stipulates that whatever is the record of a transaction in the exchange
database that holds as the non-repudable record. (the name witheld due to
the NDA). So they have no need for even application level non-repudiation.
Also consumers in US have Reg A that allows them to repudiate transactions
even if a business has evidence.
-Omirjan
>
> I don't see anything besides law enforcement, and I have serious
> problems in making cleartext escrow plus digital signing of
> the communication an IETF working group item.
>
> -Martin
>
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