Re: [TLS] shared secrets from passwords

[Florian Weimer <fweimer@xxxxxx>]

* Yoav Nir:

> The idea is that this shared secret has the properties that (a) it
> can't be used for anything other than IKEv2 so storing it is
> presumably OK (why?), and (b) it looks random. The RFC goes on to
> state this:
>
>                                As noted above, deriving the shared
>   secret from a password is not secure.  This construction is used
>   because it is anticipated that people will do it anyway.

[RFC 4306]

In retrospect, this is a bit off--it's insecure in what context?

The trouble with passwords is that you should have one for each
client/server pair.  Apart from the widespread deployment of more or
less interoperable implementations, this is the main reason why we
decided to use asymmetric cryptography with TLS (self-signed X.509
certificates, to be precise).

-- 
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@xxxxxx>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstraße 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99
_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@xxxxxxxx
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls