Re: [TLS] Next steps for Client Certificate URL

[Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
> Pasi.Eronen@xxxxxxxxx wrote, On 2008-03-28 07:13:
> 
>> Given this, would everyone be OK with updating the existing
>> client_certificate_url extension so that including the hash is
>> mandatory (client MUST send, server MUST NOT accept without hash)?
>> This behavior would be independent of the negotiated TLS version.
> 
> I'm trying to understand the attack against which this hash is going
> to protect, that is not already adequately protected without it.
> Can someone outline that attack here?

Usually even if you do not have an attack at hand, it might be good to 
prove that a modification to a security protocol makes it no less 
secure. By adding the hash (and considering it ideal) it is not hard to 
prove that the modified scheme is as strong as by sending the 
certificate itself.

regards,
Nikos
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