From: Charles Lindsey (chl@clw.cs.man.ac.uk)
Date: Thu Oct 11 2001 - 11:35:59 CDT
In <20011010193456.E20770@main.templetons.com> Brad Templeton <brad@templetons.com> writes:
>> Likewise, I don't want to see any scheme that relies on having a separate
>> key for every injecting site on Usenet. It will be quite enough to have
>> separate keys for all hierarchy administrators, all reputable cancellers,
>> and maybe all moderators, and maybe some trusted "advisors". Anything
>> significantly more than that is going to be unmanageable.
>Why? You keep asserting this but it's simply not the case. Certificates
>form a tree. You can have one or a million and the complexity is the
>same. The complexity lies only in the certificate language, and I would
>be very surprised if any certificate language design didn't include
>attributes for domain ownership, because injectors need that.
Certificates form a directed graph. The set of certificates accompanying a
signed article also form a directed graph, though it may be more tree like
in practice. But I have already shown that the number of certificates
required to accompany an article will be unacceptably high.
-- Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------ Tel: +44 161 436 6131 Fax: +44 161 436 6133 Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl Email: chl@clw.cs.man.ac.uk Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K. PGP: 2C15F1A9 Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5