Problems with MSP
Raph Levien (raph@c2.org)
Wed, 14 Feb 1996 17:40:51 -0800 (PST)
At the urging of one of the list members, I took a look at the MSP
documents available from the IMC Web server.
I did not like what I saw. Implementing MSP requires the
implementation of a lot of X.400 and ASN.1 garbage. The whole thing would
be very, very complex. I can see a single person implementing MOSS, PGP,
or S/MIME, but probably not MSP.
Complexity aside, I saw problems with features and compatibility as
well. From what I understand, all messages (including signed messages)
are encoded in a BER-encoded ASN.1 structure. Such a structure is
effectively binary and cannot be transported over RFC 822 without
additional encoding (presumably MIME base64). Thus, MSP signed messages
would be unreadable to recipients not in possession of an MSP agent.
In my personal opinion, this is the single most important feature of
any signed message format. PGP, PGP/MIME, MOSS, and S/MIME all go to
great lengths to ensure that the original message is clearly recoverable
from the signed message format.
The documents assert that MSP can be used over RFC 822 channels, but
this claim is not supported. Presumably, Internet multimedia types would
need to be MIME encoded, converted to X.400, encrypted by MSP, then
embedded in another MIME object. This process sounds complex,
inefficient, and error prone. I contend that the burden of proof falls on
MSP's proponents to demonstrate why such complexity is justified.
I agree that MSP's signed receipt type is valuable, but see no reason
why it can't be implemented as, say, a MIME receipt type which is then
signed with the standard MIME-based signature protocol. In other words, I
see nothing inherent in MSP that enables this feature.
I believe that the combination of these factors renders MSP unsuitable
for the goal of a widely deployed, transparent crypto protocol for
Internet email. We should spend time on MSP at the conference only if this
is not our goal, or if I can be shown wrong. The issue of unreadability of
signed message formats alone would seem to doom the protocol.
Raph